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Wight: Wight: No out for the Federal Government

No Out for the Federal Government:
Enforcing Contractual Arbitration

Clauses in Federal Government False
Claims Actions
U S. v. Bankers Ins. Co. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
As a party to one-fourth of all civil litigation2 the federal government exerts
a looming presence in American judicial proceedings. Thus, attempts by the
government to elude obligations under arbitration agreements, if successful, would

significantly impact the elite status that pre-dispute contractual arbitration clauses
currently hold.' This casenote examines how the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit recently addressed this issue in the context of a false claims action.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Bankers Insurance Company (Bankers), a private company, was a
participant in the Write-Your-Own (WYO) program ofthe National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP).4 As a WYO participant, Bankers was allowed to sell and
administer flood insurance policies to the public under terms and conditions
governed by a Financial Assistance/Subsidy Arrangement (Arrangement) between
Bankers, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Federal
Insurance Administration (FIA).3 Article VIH of the Arrangement contains an
arbitration provision which reads:

1. 245 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2001).
2. In 1990, twenty-five percent of all federal civil cases involved the government. See FavoringADR.
Bush Sets Rules to Stem Suits by U.S. Agencies, 10 Alts. to the High Cost of Litig. 2 (1992).
3. See Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, Top Ten Developments in Arbitrationin the
1990s, 55 Dis. Res. J. 24, 83-84 (2001).
4. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 317. The NFIP was established by Congress in the National Flood Insurance
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-129 (1994) (hereinafter NFIA).

5. Id. The FIA oversees the administration of the NFIP under the charge of FEMA. See 44 C.F.R.
§ 2.31 (1999).
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If any misunderstanding or dispute arises between the Company [Bankers]
and the FIA with reference to any factual issue under any provision of this
arrangement ... such misunderstanding or dispute may be submitted to
arbitration for a determination [that] shall be binding upon approval by the
FIA.6
The Arrangement was renewed annually from 1984 until 1997. Thereafter,
the United States, on behalf of FEMA, filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland against Bankers alleging a violation of the False
Claims Act (FCA), breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust
enrichment." Bankers responded with a motion to stay the proceedings pending
arbitration as prescribed in Article VIII of the Arrangement. 9 The district court
denied the stay request finding, "traditional principles governing arbitration have no
application to a suit brought by a federal agency asserting a claim under the False
Claims Act."'" Subsequently, Bankers brought an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)" before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 2
Bankers' contention that the Arrangement's arbitration provision was
binding in this case rested on three assertions. 3 First, Bankers argued that the
language of the Arrangement's arbitration clause made arbitration mandatory rather
than permissive.' 4 Second, Bankers argued the district court erred by ignoring the
"heavy presumption of arbitrability" merely because the case involved an FCA
claim.' 5 Finally, Bankers contended that all claims in the government's complaint,
including the FCA claim, arose from the Arrangement and therefore should have6
been submitted to arbitration as prescribed in the Arrangement's arbitration clause.'

6. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 318 (quoting 44 C.F.R. § 62 App. A and J.A. 42 1999) (The Arrangement's
arbitration provision duplicates a form agreement established and mandated by FEMA in 44 C.F.R.§ 62
App. A.).

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). Section two of the FAA, which was originally passed as the United
States Arbitration Act in 1925, declares that "[a] written provision... [to arbitrate] a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Under the FAA
"an appeal may be taken from an order refusing a stay of any action under section three of this title." 9
U.S.C. § 16(a)(I)(A). Section three of the FAA governs actions, which have an issue referable to
arbitration under a written agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
12. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 317.
13. Id. at 318-19.
14. Id.at 318.
15. Id.at 318-19.
16. Id.at 319.
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The government responded by asserting that sovereign immunity precluded the
application of the arbitration agreement absent the government's consent to
arbitrate. 7 Additionally, the government argued the Arrangement's arbitration
clause was permissive rather than mandatory, and binding arbitration is statutorily
prohibited under the NFIA, which established the NFIP. i s Finally, the government
asserted that because the Attorney General was not a party to the Arrangement, the
government was not bound by the Arrangement to arbitrate an FCA claim.' 9
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of
the stay request.2" The court remanded the case finding: (1) where the United States
initiates a suit it cannot invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity to escape
contractual obligations concerning the litigation procedure; (2) the language of the
arbitration clause provided an aggrieved party with a choice between arbitration or
abandonment of the claim; (3) a non-binding arbitration provision does not
necessarily make arbitration futile and the arbitration provision was enforceable; and
(4) the presence of a FCA claim does not render an arbitration provision
unenforceable."
1Il. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The CurrentPosition on ContractualArbitration Clauses
Pre-dispute contractual arbitration clauses that come before United States
However, this
courts today are receiving virtually unwavering affimnation.'
resounding support for arbitration agreements reflects a shift from the judicial
attitude ofjust a few decades ago.' The movement toward recognition of arbitration
clauses began in 1925 with the enactment of the FAA.24 The Congressional intent
of the FAA was "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements.. . and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts."25 While the FAA enjoyed a somewhat slow inception period, concerns
in the 1980's that the American judicial system was overburdened and judicial

17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4083(b)). The NFIA specifically states: "Such arbitration shall be
only upon the approval of the [FEMA] Director."
advisory in nature ...final
19. Id.
20. Id. at 317.
21. See id. at 320-24.
22. See Huber & Trachte-Huber, supra n.3, at 83-84.
23. Id.
24. Jean R Sternlight, Panaceaor CorporateTool?: Debunkingthe Supreme Court'sPreferencefor
Binding Arbitration,74 Wash. U. L.Q. 637, 644 (1996).
25. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,24 (1991).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

3

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2002, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 15
JOURNAL OF DISPUTERESOLUTION
[Vol. 2002, No. I
resources were too strained brought arbitration to the forefront of the effort to
decrease growing dockets.26
This effort to conserve judicial resources produced case law that proclaimed
arbitration as a viable method to resolve claims.2" The Supreme Court, in Moses H.
Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury ConstructionCorp.,' announced its preference for
arbitration over litigation and instructed that all arbitration covenants must be
broadly construed and that all doubts be resolved in favor of arbitration, including
fraud in the inducement of the agreement. Since Moses, the Court has consistently
enforced arbitration clauses 29 and language reiterating that public policy favors
arbitration is3 now common3 ° and it requires courts to rigorously enforce agreements
to arbitrate. '
The preference for arbitration has been carried out through the Court's
broad interpretation of "commerce" which falls within the FAA. 32 The modem
interpretation allows the FAA to apply to almost all business disputes.33
Additionally, the Supreme Court has thwarted any state efforts to restrict or
discourage arbitration.34 In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court issued a
controversial opinion holding that the FAA not only applied to state courts but state
courts' interpretation of their state's statutes. 3 Thus, the Court established that the
FAA preempted states from overriding arbitration agreements. 36 Despite protests

26. See Harold Brown, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 30 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 743, 747-48. See also
Sternlight, supra n. 24, at 661.
27. See Sternlight, supra n. 24, at 661.
28. 460 U.S. 1,25 (1983) (instructing courts to resolve procedural or substantive defects over scope
of arbitration clause in favor of arbitration).
29. Stemlight, supran. 24, at 641. See e.g. Shearson/AmericanExpress,Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 226 (1987) ("Absent a well-founded claim that an arbitration agreement resulted from the sort of
fraud or excessive economic power that would provide grounds for the revocation of any contract the
Arbitration Act provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the
otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbitrability.").
30. A Westlaw search conducted Oct. 2, 2001, revealed twenty-eight federal court decisions in 2000
expounding language that public policy favors arbitration. See e.g. MediterraneanShipping Co. S.A.
Geneva v. POL-Atlantic, 229 F.3d 397 (2d Cir. 2000); Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709 (6th Cir.
2000); Johnson v. West Surburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000); PortlandGen. Elec. Co. v. U.S.
Bank Trust Nat. Assn as Trusteefor Trust No. 1, 218 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2000).
31. See eg. Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 1998).
32. See Perryv. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,490 (1987) (asserting the FAA embodies congressional intent
to enforce arbitration agreements "within the full reach of the Commerce Clause").
33. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,274-77 (1995) (The Court found
a contract between a small, locally owned business and a home owner was within the FAA as it was a
transaction "involving commerce" and congressional intent was to exercise commerce powerfully.).
34. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984) (voiding California's law overriding
arbitration agreements).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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from many state attorneys general" the Court reaffirmed SouthlandinAllied-Bruce
Terminix Cos, Inc.3s Allied-Bruce further extended the scope of the FAA into state
territory by adopting an extremely broad interpretation of interstate commerce that
included any transaction Congress would have the power to regulate directly under
its commerce power, regardless of party intention.39
The monumental step away from the traditional notion that statutory claims
were inarbitrable has increased the use of arbitration.' The divergence from the
traditional attitude began with the Supreme Court's announcement, "by agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum."'4 Subsequently, arbitration has been upheld in "controversies under various
federal statutes historically shielded from arbitration, such as the antitrust laws, the
securities acts, and [the] Racketeer influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO),"'42 and claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.4 3 Thus,
"arbitration is now viewed as an alternative forum for raising statutory as well as
contractual claims."" The presumption that a statutory claim is arbitrable can only
be overridden with explicit evidence from the text or legislative history of a statute
showing Congress's affirmative intent to preclude arbitration of a statutory claim. 5
This places a heavy burden on the party opposing arbitration 6 and this burden has
been rarely satisfied in cases before the Supreme Court.47
B. ContractualArbitrationClauses
Based on the judicial system's willingness to uphold arbitration clauses, it
is not surprising that there has been an explosion in the use of arbitration clauses."
Between 1985 and 1986 the American Arbitration Association's commercial

37. Twenty state attorneys general joined together in an amicus brief to ask the Court to reverse its
holding in Southland when the Court granted certiorari in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. See
Stemlight, supra n. 24, at 665.
38. 513 U.S. 265.
39. Id.
40. Huber & Trachte-Huber, supra n. 3, at 27.
41. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,627 (1985) (holding that
even if antitrust claims could not be domestically arbitrated, they should be arbitrzble as an international
transaction).
42. Brown, supra n. 26, at 749-50.
43. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-33.
44. Huber & Trachte-Huber, supra n. 3, at 27.
45. Id. See e.g. Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., Ltd., 815 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1987).
46. Huber & Trachte-Huber, supra n. 3, at 27.
47. See Stemlight, supra n. 24, at 672.
48. Id. at 638. See also Huber & Trachte-Huber, supra n. 3, at 30.
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arbitrations increased from 6,000 to 53,000 and the trend has continued."9
Traditionally, the pre-dispute arbitration clauses are "the most prevalent method of
creating arbitration proceedings, as evidenced by arbitrations organized under the
American Arbitration Association, of which ninety-five percent of its 70,000
Pre-dispute arbitration
arbitrations occur as a result of pre-dispute clauses."'
covenants are now common in numerous legally binding agreements including
stockbroker agreements, bank contracts with depositors and borrowers, franchise
arrangements, 5 insurance claims, attorney/client contracts, physician/patient
agreements, and employment contracts.52
The increasing use of arbitration clauses and the preferential treatment
given these clauses has affected both civil parties and the federal government,53
which has traditionally opposed the use of binding arbitration.' For over 150 years
"the United States, acting through the Department of Justice, positioned that the
Constitution bars the United States from submitting to binding arbitration by an
independent arbitrator."55 However, on September 7, 1995, the United States
Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) reversed its previous view
and issued an opinion that the OLC, "no longer takes the view that the Appointments
Clause bars the United States from entering into binding arbitration."' In addition,
the OLC did "not view any other constitutional provision or doctrine as imposing a
general prohibition against the federal government entering into binding
arbitration."57 The memo concluded:
Where there is no statute requiring parties to enter into binding arbitration,
the parties may nevertheless agree to do so. The same may be said of the
government when it is a party. Absent a statute to the contrary and
assuming the availability of authority to effect any remedy that might result
from the arbitration, we perceive no broad constitutional prohibition on the
government entering into binding arbitration.5"

49. Brown, supra n. 26, at 748.
50. Jonathan D. Mester, The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996: Will the New ADR in
FederalAdministrativeAgencies Occur at the Expense ofPublicAccountability?, 13 Ohio St. J. on Dis.
Res. 167, 178 (1997).
51. Brown, supra n. 26, at 745.
52. Huber & Trachte-Huber, supra n. 3, at 30.
53. P. Jean Baker, Binding Arbitration:Federalv. Private, 55 Dis. Res. J. 19, 20 (May 2000).
54. See Tenaska Washington Partners11, L.P. v. U.S., 34 Fed. Cl. 434, 438 (1995).
55. Id.
56. Walter Dellinger, ConstitutionalLimitations on Federal Government Participationin Binding
Arbitration,7 World Arb. & Mediation Rep. 23,23 (1996).
57. Id. at 33.
58. Id. at 32.
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While the memorandum is binding on the Department of Justice and other executive
branch agencies, it does not force courts to accept the asserted legal theory. 59
However, courts have accepted this theory and bound federal agencies to agreements
to arbitrate in the absence a of statutory barrier.' The court held the government's
immunity precluded a specific performance order against the government but
monetary awards were enforceable. 6'
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Sovereign Immunity
In Bankers, the court faced echos of traditional anti-arbitration attitudes in
determining whether the government should be bound by a pre-dispute contract
arbitration clause when it initiates a federal statutory claim against a private party.
The court began its analysis by rejecting the argument that sovereign immunity6 2
precluded the government from being forced to engage in arbitration, and thus
relieved the government of any contractual obligation to arbitrate claims.63 The
court found that the government's status as instigator was fatal to the government's
sovereign immunity argument because sovereign immunity could only be utilized
as a shield from suit - not a sword.' Citing GuarantyTrust Co. v. United States,'5
the court held that "by voluntarily appearing in the role of suitor [the sovereign]
abandons its immunity from suit and subjects itself to the procedure and rules of
decision governing the forum which it has sought."" The government not only
initiated the civil action before the court, it also created and mandated the terms of
its legal relationship with Bankers under the Arrangement including the arbitration
clause.67 The court concluded the government could not evoke sovereign immunity
to evade its contractual obligations.6 '

59. Tenaska, 34 Fed. Cl. at 440.
60. Id. at 438-40.
61. See id. at 443-44 (holding specific performance is not available as a remedy because of
immunity).

62. Sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine that provides the United States with absolute
immunity from suit absent its consent. See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983) ('IT]he
United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress.").
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Bankers, 245 F.3d at 319.
Id. at 320.
304 U.S. 126, 134 (1938).
Bankers, 245 F.3d at 320.
Id. at 319-20.

68. Id.
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B. Permissive Language
Denial of the government's sovereign immunity argument necessitated that
the court further analyze whether other grounds existed that might discharge the
government from its contract responsibilities under the Arrangement arbitration
clause.69 The court first examined the language of the Arrangement's arbitration
clause to determine if there was any merit to the government's argument that the
clause used permissive language, making arbitration non-mandatory." The clause
7
read, "any such misunderstanding or dispute may be submitted to arbitration."1'
Following guidance lent by the Fourth Circuit and three other circuits in
interpretation of similar clauses,72 the court concluded that the language used in the
Arrangement arbitration clause oreated a choice between arbitration or abandonment
of the action.73 The court reasoned that because parties can always voluntarily
submit to arbitration any contrary interpretation would render the arbitration
provision meaningless.74
C. Futility of Non-Binding Arbitration
The court continued its analysis by addressing the government's assertion
that the arbitration provision should not be applied because it is non-binding 7 on the
government and, as a result, will not adequately resolve the dispute with Bankers.76
Though the court conceded that the government's right to reject an arbitration award
or decision left open the possibility that the case will not be resolved by a mandatory
arbitration, the court refused to classify non-binding arbitration as a futile exercise.7
The court's resistance rested on the rationalization that "the government would

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 320.
Id.
Id.
See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 886 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding

the phrase "may be referred to arbitration" gives "an aggrieved party the choice between arbitration and
abandonment of his claim"); Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. Austin Co., 914 F.2d 1103, 1104 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding the phrase "ifboth parties agree" mandates arbitration); Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Int'
Longshoremen's Assn., 683 F.2d 242, 246-47 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating "may refer the grievance to
arbitration" is mandatory); Local 771, LA.TS.E. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 546 F.2d 1107, 1116 (2d Cir. 1977)

(stating "may submit to arbitration" is mandatory).
73. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 320.
74. Id. at 321.
75. Under the NFIA the FIA Director must approve an arbitration award, decision, orrecommendation
before it is permitted to "become final." 42 U.S.C. § 4083(b). While the government is thus not bound
by any arbitration decision, Bankers is bound under the Arrangement by the arbitration decision.
Bankers, 245 F.3d at 322.
76. Id. at 321.
77. Id. at 322-23.
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presumably act reasonably and rationally, and would approve an arbitration award
'
Furthermore, citing Wosey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker,
or decision that it found favorable."78
79
Inc., the court concluded that even if the arbitration proved to be futile that fact
does not present a legal obstacle to the enforceability of a non-binding arbitration
clause.'0
D. PreclusionofFCA Claimsfrom Arbitration
The court's final analysis addressed the government's contention that the
arbitration clause could not be enforced because of the Attorney General's presence
in the action as representative of the United States' interests and the nature of an
FCA claim.8 The government argued that because the Attorney General was not a
party to the Arrangement he should not be forced to abide by the Arrangement's
provisions when asserting his exclusive statutory authorityP to enforce the FCA.8 3
The court rejected this argument finding that as the Attorney General's rights and
responsibilities under the Arrangement consisted solely ofthose derivative ofFEMA
and the FIA, agencies which possessed no right to ignore the arbitration agreement,
the Attorney General also could not ignore the agreement.' To allow the Attorney
General to do so would be to ignore applicable precedent which established, "when
a third party sues on a contract, any arbitration provision contained therein remains
in force." '
The government argued alternatively that even if the other claims were
subject to arbitration, the statutory civil FCA claim should not be arbitrated because
the Attorney General was the exclusive enforcer of the FCA and to force him to
arbitrate an FCA claim would dilute his authority.' The court found the government
failed to provide sufficient reasoning to support divergent treatment of an FCA claim
from other civil statutory claims, which the Supreme Court has held are subject to

78. Id. at 323.
79. 144 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding non-binding arbitration clause to be enforceable).
80. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 322.
81. Id at323.
82. Id.
83. "If the Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is violating [the FCA], the Attorney
General may bring a civil action under this section against the person." 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1994).
84. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 323.
85. Id. In support of its finding the court cited Intl Paper Co. v. Sehwabedissen Maschinen &
Anlagen GMBH, which held that it would "both disregard equity and contravene [the FAA]" to allow
a plaintiff "to claim the benefit of the contract and simultaneously avoid its burdens." Int I!PaperCo,
206 F.3d 411, 418 (4th Cir. 2000).
86. Id. at 324.
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arbitration. 7 The court reasoned the arbitration would be non-binding on the
government and that the government provided no valid basis for its claim that
arbitration would impair the Attorney General's authority.8 To the contrary, the
court noted that the Department of Justice policy favors use of alternative dispute
resolution in FCA cases. 9 Thus, the court concluded the government had no special
right to ignore its contract responsibilities, and it could not avoid these
responsibilities by invoking a civil statutory claim."
The court's determination that there was no valid basis for treating the FCA
claim differently than other statutory claims led to its final analysis, which required
the court to determine whether the claim's underlying factual allegations were
"within the scope of the arbitration clause, regardless of the legal label assigned to
the claim."'. Following this model the court held that the FCA claim was within the
scope of the Arrangement's arbitration clause, because the Arrangement governs the
duties that were imposed on Bankers.'
The court concluded "where the
Government has previously agreed to an arbitration process, the statutory authority
of the Attorney General is not compromised by that agreement being honored" and
the government should be bound by the law like all other parties.93
E. The DissentRegardingthe Arbitrabilityof FCA Claims
In a separate decision concurring in part and dissenting in part Judge
Seymour dissented to the majority's conclusion that the FCA claim was arbitrable."
In Seymour's opinion the FCA claim did not arise pursuant to the Arrangement and
therefore the issue of arbitration was governed by the language of the controlling

87. Id. The court specifically cited Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, which held
statutory claims under RICO and the federal securities laws are subject to arbitration. Shearson, 482
U.S. 220, 226 (1987)
88. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 324.
89. Id. (citing Policy on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. §§ 36895, 36899
(1996)) ("[L]itigation. .. under the False [C]laims Act... [is a] good candidate for ADR mechanisms.").
90. Id. The court cited U.S. v. Carter,454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972) for the proposition that a
contract signed by an authorized official of the government binds the entire government. The court
noted that under 28 U.S.C. § 516, the Attorney General is entrusted with the power to direct all litigation
involving the United States. Although the FIA possessed authority to enter into the Arrangement and the
arbitration provision therein, nothing prevents the Attorney General from using his position (to control
litigation on behalf of the government) to insure that federal agencies refrain from agreeing to arbitrate
potential FCA claims. The court cited Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332,1340-41 (9th Cir. 1994) in support
of this proposition.
91. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 325 (citing J.J.Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Pulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d
315, 319 (4th Cir. 1988)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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statute - not the arbitration provision.95 Because the FCA granted the Attorney
General discretion to elect arbitration in any claim arising under the Act and did not
grant Bankers any corresponding right to seek arbitration, the government should not
be forced to arbitrate the FCA claim. 96
V. COMMENT
With language falling right in line with federal public policy favoring
arbitration and requiring courts to rigorously enforce arbitration agreements,' the
Fourth Circuit repudiated the government's objections to the enforceability of the
Arrangement arbitration clause leaving little support for future attempts by the
government to elude contract arbitration obligations. The court's eagerness to
9
resolve government resistance to participate in arbitration proceedings " is not
surprising given the federal government's common appearance in civil actions" and
the popular concern for managing judicial dockets and litigation costs.l'° The court's
citation to the Department of Justice's Policy on the Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Case Identification Criteriafor Alternative Dispute Resolution,'
which states the Fraud Unit of the Department of Justice recovered over one billion
dollars in 1995 primarily from FCA claims,"°c evidences the court was cognizant of
the potential increase in arbitrable claims if the government was required to arbitrate
FCA claims.
A. The Shortcomings of the Majority Opinion
After soundly rejecting the government's arguments in favor of exemption
from any obligation to arbitrate its claims against Bankers, the majority opinion
failed to consider whether the FCA claim really arose under a contract and thus was
bound by the contract terms. Consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., °3 the Bankers court
announced it "must determine whether the factual allegations underlying the claim

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Andersons, Inc., 166 F.3d 308.
98. See Tenaska, 34 Fed. Cl. at 438.
99. See FavoringADR supra n. 2.
100. See Deloitte NorauditA/S v. DeloitteHaskins & Sells, US., 9 F.3d 1060 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding

the FAA requires federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements, reflecting Congress' recognition that
arbitration is to be encouraged as means of reducing costs and delays associated with litigation). See
also CampanielloImports, Ltd. v. SaporitiItalia S.P.A., 117 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 1997).
101. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 324.
102. 61 Fed. Reg. §§ 36895, 36899 (1996).
103. 473 U.S. 614, 622 (1985).
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are within the scope of the arbitration clause, regardless of the legal label assigned"
to determine if an arbitration agreement applies.'" However, in an apparent rush to
finally dispose of the case, the court skirted this analysis and failed to address
relevant precedent. The court dismissed the issue in cursory fashion stating that
"whether there has been a civil violation of the FCA depends on the duties imposed
on Bankers by the Arrangement, measured against its compliance thereunder."905
In a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting to the extent that the
FCA claim was arbitrable, Judge Seymour correctly points out that precedence in
this area has held that FCA claims do not arise under a contract."° Citing United
States v. The Boeing Co., ° Judge Seymour casts doubt on whether FCA claims are
bound by contract arbitration clauses. While Boeing is not binding precedent on the
Fourth Circuit, the Boeing court extracted its authority from the Supreme Court
decision United States v. Woodbury which held that the legal basis of FCA claims
is an intentional violation of the FCA and not a mere breach of contract. 0 8
According to the Boeing court, "claims under the FCA arise when a person
knowingly presents or causes to be presented a false or fraudulent claim or
knowingly makes, uses or causes to be made a false record or statement to get a
false or fraudulent claim paid."'" As a knowing act of submitting a false claim is
irrelevant to any duties that are imposed by a contract, FCA claims could easily be
found, and have in fact been found, to be independent of a contract relationship." 0
Thus, the holdings of Boeing and Woodbury appear to be in direct opposition to the
Fourth Circuit's conclusion that whether Bankers violated the FCA depended on the
duties imposed on Bankers by the Arrangement."' The court's failure to address
precedent on the relationship of FCA claims to contracts leaves the issue of whether
FCA claims are subject to pre-dispute contract arbitration provisions on unstable
ground and exposed to attack.
B. The Issue of ContractualArbitrationClauses'
Control Over FCA Claims
It is likely that future courts may divide on this issue. A clear trend has
developed favoring the arbitrability of statutory claims which has resulted in an

104. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 325 (citing J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc., 863 F.2d at 319).
105. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 325.
106. Id.
107. 73 F. Supp. 2d 897, 910-11 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (holding "claims under the FCA do not arise
pursuant to a contract").
108. 359 F.2d 370, 377 (9th Cir. 1966).
109. Id.
110. U.S. v. The Boeing Co., 73 F. Supp. 2d at 910. See also US. v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310,313 (E.D.
Mich. 1962).
111. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 325.
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increasing number of statutory claims within the FAA." 2 Combined with the
deference with which courts must view pre-dispute arbitration provisions,11 itis very
possible that courts motivated by policy reasons may interpret broadly written
arbitration provisions to include FCA claims, as the Fourth Circuit has done. If
future courts can adequately support a finding that the factual allegations underlying
the FCA claim are within the scope of the arbitration clause, then such a court would
be well within its authority to compel the government to arbitrate FCA claims.
Statutory claims only override federal policy in favor of arbitration where the party
opposing arbitration is able to show that Congress reserved a federal forum to
vindicate rights under the statute." 4 On its face, the statutory language of the FCA
does not evidence that Congress had such an intent with respect to FCA claims."'
However, as the court's authority to compel arbitration under the FAA
hinges on finding that FCA claims are within the scope of contract arbitration
provisions, 116 the apparent textual support for finding that FCA claims are
independent of contracts presents a significant obstacle for such an outcome. The
exemption of FCA claims from the broad, seemingly all-encompassing scope of the
FAA would mark a significant departure from the trend of finding statutory claims
within the FAA scope." 7
Courts like the Fourth Circuit, which are not persuaded that FCA claims are
subject to contract provisions, are likely to conclude that a court cannot compel the
government to arbitrate an FCA claim. The federal policy favoring arbitration may
not extend the reach of arbitration beyond the intended scope of the clause providing
for it."' In the absence of a controlling contract provision, the issue of arbitrability
of a FCA claim must be determined by looking at the language of the controlling
statute. 9 Title thirty-one of the United States Code calls for the Attorney General
to diligently investigate any potential violations of the FCA and, if she finds a
violation, the Attorney General may bring a civil action. ' The statutory language
places the pursuit of FCA claims within the discretion of the Attorney General.' 2 '
None of the provisions of the FCA grants defendants in FCA actions the right to seek
arbitration when the Attorney General has chosen an alternate form of adjudication

112. Huber & Trachte-Huber, supra n. 3, at 27.
113. Andersons, Inc., 166 F.3d 308.
114. Genesco, Inc., 815 F.2d 840.
115. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 325.
116. Adamovic v. METME Corp., 961 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding where no agreement to
arbitrate exists the courts cannot compel arbitration).
117. See Brown, supran. 26, at 749-50. See also Huber & Trachte-Huber, supran. 3, at 27.
118. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. CentralLife Assur. Co, 85 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1996).
119. Id.
120. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a).
121. Bankers, 245 F.3d at 326.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

13

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2002, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 15
JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION
[Vol. 2002, No. I
of the issue. Thus, a court's finding that FCA claims are not governed by a contract
provision places defendants at the will of the Attorney General for such claims.
While Bankers strengthened the argument that the federal government, like
all other parties, is bound to pre-dispute contract arbitration provisions, its weak
analysis of whether FCA claims fall within broad contract arbitration provisions fails
to resolve the issue for future courts. In light of the potential for varying outcomes
regarding this issue, and the potential effect due to the sheer volume of FCA cases,
this issue should be resolved by the Supreme Court.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Bankers court held: (1) the federal government cannot invoke the
doctrine of sovereign immunity to elude contractual obligations when it initiates
suits; (2) the language of an arbitration clause which appears permissive rather than
mandatory can only be interpreted to provide an aggrieved party with a choice
between arbitration or abandonment of the claim; (3) a non-binding arbitration
provision is enforceable; and (4) FCA claims are within the scope of pre-dispute
resolution arbitration contract provisions and thus subject to arbitration. " While the
court's findings in Bankers have furthered efforts to erode the government's
resistance to arbitration, its treatment of the issue of the applicability of pre-dispute
contract provisions to FCA claims is inadequate to resolve the issue for future courts.
Thus, FCA claims cannot confidently be counted among the growing number of
statutory claims that are arbitrable under the FAA.

SARAH A. WIGHT

122. See id. at 320-24.
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